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Overview
The field of administrative law is inextricably bound to two phenomena that trace their origins to the nineteenth century: the rise of large state bureaucracies designed to fulfill a complex array of societal needs and the development of liberal democratic norms of social organization and public authority. Much of administrative law can be understood as an attempt to work out the tension inherent in these two phenomena: the recognition that the attainment of public purposes is contingent on a cadre of full-time employees, paid by the public purse and loyal to the state, and, at the same time, the belief that public authority is legitimate only if embedded in democratic politics and liberal societies. To put it more succinctly, these are the objectives, on the one hand, of neutrality and expertise, and, on the other hand, of democracy and liberal rights.
The common aspiration of making public administration both capable and accountable serves as the springboard for the comparative analysis in this chapter. I begin with a discussion of what, in the law, is taken to be the hallmark of modern bureaucracy-the legal guarantees of civil service employment-together with national variations in the professionalization of administration and contemporary efforts to cut back on civil service guarantees. I then turn to three important types of accountability: the contestation of administrative action before the courts, the involvement of organized interests in administrative policymaking, and informal accountability to the general public through parliamentary ombudsmen and transparency guarantees. These categories serve as a framework for exploring the similarities and differences that shape contemporary administrative law systems. The chapter concludes with the increasingly important phenomenon of the globalization of administrative law and the rapid migration of administrative principles across legal systems throughout the world, both national and international. In line with the intellectual purpose of this volume, I have omitted topics that have traditionally been considered peripheral to the field or that fall at the intersection with other disciplines, for instance the constitutional powers of the executive branch over public administration and the empowerment of private groups through selfregulation, and refer the reader to the bibliography at the end of the chapter for guidance.
Public Administration
One of the defining elements of bureaucracy is civil service employment: the selection and promotion of public officials based on merit and insulated from political influence through tenured employment. 1 The legal guarantees of civil service employment emerged to serve multiple ends: autocratic rulers seeking to consolidate their authority (Prussia), political elites adapting the instruments of government to the demands of industrialization and urbanization (Britain), and government reformers intent on shielding administration from the instability and incompetence of party-patronage appointments (France and the United States). In Europe, Japan, and North America, civil service safeguards were introduced over the course of the nineteenth century:
beginning in the 1840s in France, 1870 in Britain, 1873 in Prussia, 1882 in Canada, 1887
in Japan, and 1883 in the United States.
Modern civil service laws are designed to render public employees independent of partisan politics and competent to perform the business of the nation. Some legal systems go so far as to constitutionalize this ambition, including the Italian Constitution (Articles 97 and 98) and the German Basic Law (Article 33). The core features of civil service employment are: (1) life tenure absent grave misconduct; (2) merit-based recruitment; (3) promotion based on a mixture of seniority and merit (often accompanied by independent civil service commissions); (4) pay scales and benefits that are more standardized than in private enterprise; and (5) restrictions on political activity, speech, and union activities, although these are far less common now than in the past.
Notwithstanding the common impulse to develop a professionalized public administration, there remain significant differences in the degree to which recruitment is professional or political. At the top echelons of the bureaucracy, political appointments are more extensive in the United States than in other countries, on the theory that electoral winners should have an opportunity to impose a new set of priorities on government administration through the selection of high-level personnel. 2 There are also significant differences in the extent of patronage appointments at the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Some countries appear to be particularly vulnerable to party-based infiltration of the public administration, notwithstanding a legal commitment to an independent, professionally competent civil service. Italy represents but one example of this phenomenon. 3 A number of mechanisms, related to the historically weak nature of party competition, have enabled political parties and party-affiliated trade unions to circumvent the civil service system and carve out the public administration among themselves. These mechanisms include the unofficial assignment of government sectors to certain political parties-for instance, in the past, the Ministry of Agriculture to the Christian Democrats-and the recruitment of personnel through temporary contracts, which are then converted into permanent employment by law or government decree.
The past twenty years or so have witnessed a number of challenges to the traditional model of civil service employment. 4 The most important is the wave of New The origins of the common law-droit administratif divide are extremely complex and have been the object of numerous distinguished studies. 6 For our purposes, it is enough to recall the very different historical circumstances surrounding the rise of bureaucracy and administrative law in France and England. In France, the drive to consolidate absolute authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was marked by intense conflicts between the royal officers responsible for administering the provinces (intendants) and the powerful regional courts in the hands of local elites (Parlements). In an attempt to insulate the decisions of the intendants from interference by the Parlements, legal oversight was entrusted to a special body directly controlled by the monarchy (Conseil du Roi). The system of a specialized review body was borrowed during the French Revolution, albeit motivated by a very different republican theory aimed at destroying the special privileges and vested interests of the Parlements of the Ancien Régime and ensuring that government officials would not encounter resistance from the old elites in carrying out the will of the people. Napoleon, in turn, embraced this system with the founding of the Council of State (Conseil d'État). It was at this time that the distinctive French separation of powers doctrine was born, according to which "to judge the administration is still to administer" (juger l'administration c'est encore administrer):
judicial review by the ordinary courts represented an encroachment upon the executive power and therefore oversight had to be entrusted to a specialized body connected with the executive branch. Later, when a substantial, centralized bureaucracy emerged, largely in response to nineteenth-century industrialization, the stature of the common law was such that there could be no question of ousting the courts and transferring administrative disputes to a separate body.
Let us explore the common law-droit administratif difference in more detail. In 1885, the English scholar Albert Venn Dicey famously proclaimed that in England, with the elaboration of numerous legal doctrines specific to administration, the creation of a specific procedure for judicial review, the widespread resort to administrative tribunals (explained below), and the establishment of a special section of the ordinary courts devoted to administrative law, it is evident that even in England, administrative law is a field apart from private law. The main vestiges of the original model that have survived are to be found in the area of government torts and public contracts, which are considered part of the general law of torts and contracts, and in the continuing power of common law courts to hear, in the last resort, cases brought against the government.
In France, the Council of State (Conseil d'État) was originally established by Napoleon. 9 Then, as now, the Council of State had the dual function of drafting government laws and rules and hearing cases against government administration.
Originally, the Council of State's dispute-resolution function was subject to extensive Mirroring the institutional separation between the judiciary and the Council of State, the study and doctrinal elaboration of administrative law in France is marked by a self-conscious divide between public and private law. In public law thinking, state administration is granted extraordinary privileges (the prerogatives of the puissance publique) but is also subject to extensive duties designed to safeguard the rights and interests of citizens. One clear example of this is the important concept of "public service." 10 The notion of public service was invented to cover any state activity performed in the general interest, not simply the core functions of policing and defense.
Once a government activity is classified as a "public service," the state is empowered to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure the continuity of that service and adaptation to changing circumstances, but it is also under a duty to treat the citizen-users of the public service equally and neutrally. To ensure continuity and adaptability, the administration is permitted to unilaterally modify government contracts with private providers but it is also required to compensate the provider for any loss suffered as a consequence.
Linked to this understanding of the special concerns of public law is the sweeping scope of the field. In contrast with common law systems like the United States, where public contracts and government liability are taught as specialty subjects and are omitted from most administrative law textbooks, in the French tradition, state liability and government contracts are integral to the discipline. The theoretical apparatus of government privileges and duties at the core of administrative law extends to all forms of administrative action and all attempts to obtain individual redress from government wrongs. As many have observed, however, public law is coming to borrow more and more from private law and therefore, even in France, public contracts and governmental liability are losing some of their distinctiveness. 11 An alternative that has emerged to the English and French models of judicial review is that of a specialized branch of the judiciary dedicated to hearing administrative law cases. 12 The first example is generally taken to be Germany. There the judicial branch is composed of the Federal Constitutional Court and five discrete judicial hierarchies, one for civil and criminal law, one for labor disputes, one for tax disputes, one for social security disputes, and one for administrative law disputes. The latter three all handle variants of what would be called administrative law cases in other countries.
The judges that serve on the tax, social security, and administrative law courts are recruited based on the same system of university study, exams, and traineeships as their counterparts on other courts and share the same, identical guarantee of independence.
The only difference is the degree of specialization and familiarity that the members of these three branches acquire with administrative disputes.
The systems in this third category operate closer to the common law model than the French one. In Germany as well as other countries that have chosen to adopt a specialized judiciary, government contract and tort disputes are heard by the civil courts, not by the administrative courts, and the doctrine tracks the private law of contract and tort. Moreover, administrative litigation is designed to protect individual rights and interests, much as private law litigation, and therefore the conditions under which standing is granted are more limited than in French law while, at the same time, the remedial powers of courts are broader.
Most legal systems have adopted one of these three institutional models.
Histories of colonial rule can go some way in explaining the patterns that we see today.
The territories that were part of the British Empire and that adopted the common law have entrusted generalist courts with hearing disputes between individuals and public administration. These include Australia, New Zealand, India, Ireland, and the United Traditionally, one of the differences that separated the common law from continental legal systems was its reliance on procedural principles of fair play in judging the correctness of administrative action. 14 The common law tended to equate important categories of administrative action with the adjudication of courts and to require analogous procedural safeguards. By contrast, the administrative law of continental Europe was more focused on the substantive correctness of administrative decisions in deciding whether to let them stand. 15 In English law, this procedural emphasis was encapsulated by the principle of natural justice, which included the right to be heard and the right to an impartial adjudicator, also known as the rule against bias. In American law, these same guarantees have been developed in the constitutional case law on procedural due process. Although the French Council of State began fashioning procedural requirements for government administration as far back as 1944, with a line of cases on the "rights of the defense" (droits de la défense), these rights were more limited than their common law counterparts: they generally excluded rights to an oral hearing and the disclosure of documents and they only applied to those administrative decisions that were cast as imposing sanctions.
Since the 1970s, however, this common law-continental law difference has faded.
A products on the grounds that the statute under which the government was acting could only be interpreted to give it authority over medical drugs, not tobacco. 24 The same challenge would be styled as incompetence or a violation of law in France and an error of law or illegality in England.
basic liberties against government action. This was true even in the absence of a written bill of rights enforceable by the courts, as was the case in most countries until the 1950s, given the importance of property rights in both the common law and civil law codes.
With the spread of written constitutions in the twentieth century, as well as international human rights instruments, in particular the European Convention of Human Rights, the catalogue of rights that courts are expected to defend against administrative action has expanded: freedom of expression and association, the right to privacy and human dignity, personal liberty, the right to engage in the trades, and much more. All of these rights can be readily breached by the decisions of immigration authorities, social security agencies, licensing boards, and other government bodies and they are commonly invoked before the courts.
On this aspect of judicial review, let us dwell on Germany for a moment, where fundamental rights guarantees are particularly pervasive and administrative law has been thoroughly constitutionalized, more so than in other European systems and the United
States. The most conspicuous sign of this is probably the declaration, made in 1959 by the President of the Federal Administrative Court, that administrative law is "concretised constitutional law" (konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht). 26 The German courts have developed a number of cross-cutting principles that are designed to limit administrative action to the benefit of individual liberties. Three in particular bear mention:
proportionality, equality, and legitimate expectations.
Any measure that interferes with a right must satisfy a proportionality test. In this sequential inquiry, the government must demonstrate that the measure is capable of achieving the declared public ends; that it is necessary to achieve those ends and that no other, equally effective and less rights-restrictive measures are available for accomplishing the same purposes; and that the public benefit from the measure outweighs These rights, albeit with numerous modifications and with significant differences in judicial practice, have gone on to influence the case law of the European Court of Justice and other European legal systems. 29 The constitutionalization of European administrative law stands in marked contrast with the United States, where the Supreme Court is highly deferential to government action that burdens the economic rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 30 These are the very rights that are most commonly implicated by administrative determinations yet so-called "rational basis" review under the Fourteenth Amendment is a tremendously lenient standard when compared to the principles of proportionality and equality in German law.
The last form of judicial review of administrative action is review for policy rationality. Doctrinally, rationality review picks up where legality review leaves off:
when controlling legislation does not contain standards to guide administrative action and thus effectively leaves decisionmaking to bureaucratic discretion, the courts nonetheless can evaluate administrative action based on criteria related to sound policymaking.
Doctrinal expressions of this form of review give the impression that only acts of confirmed insanity will be struck by the courts: review for "arbitrary and capricious" decisionmaking in the United States 31 and review for "manifest error of assessment" has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. .
. . 34 In State Farm, the Supreme Court struck an administrative decision revoking a passenger-safety rule requiring automobiles to be fitted with automatic seatbelts or airbags. It found that the tests and studies in the agency's record did not support a determination that the rule would fail to produce safety benefits and it faulted the agency for failing to consider other policy options for ensuring passenger safety, namely an airbag-only rule.
Although European rights-based proportionality review and American arbitrary and capricious review overlap in some respects, their essence is fundamentally different.
In the former, the focus is on the individual right and the decision to overturn the administrative act turns on an assessment of the importance of the right as compared to the public purpose as well as the ability of the administration to articulate a close connection between the government measure and the public purpose. In the latter, the focus is on the quality of the science and policymaking assessments behind the administrative decision and the ability of the government to justify its chosen course of action in the face of alternative scientific evidence and policy options put forward by its opponents.
Administration and Organized Interests
In the conventional image of public administration, bureaucrats and courts are the main protagonists. State officials deploy their considerable expertise and technical prowess to accomplish public purposes and courts watch over them to ensure that they stay within the four corners of the law. The role of social and economic groups in administrative governance has traditionally been ignored in legal scholarship, largely because the theories of democracies used to legitimate administration cast elections, representative assemblies, and independent courts as the primary agents of democracy and tend to regard interest groups with suspicion.
A growing literature, however, now recognizes that many elements of administrative law are designed to enable social and economic actors to inform and participate in administrative governance and that the legitimacy of administration rests as much on accountability to civil society as it does on judicial review and legislative oversight. 35 Industry associations, trade unions, professional associations, environmental and consumer groups, and various other actors are routinely called upon to advise on government rulemaking, manage public programs, and engage directly in standard-setting and rule-enforcement through powers of self-regulation. Due to space constraints, this section will address only one of these forms of administrative law: the procedures that empower social and economic groups to participate in government rulemaking.
A distinctive feature of American administrative law is what is known as noticeand-comment rulemaking. Before administrative agencies decide on the new policies contained in government rules-for instance, worker-safety standards for coal mines, maximum chemical concentrations for drinking water, and consumer protection rules for the banking industry-they must first give notice of the proposed rule, allow the public an opportunity to comment on the rule, and respond to any objections in a "concise general statement" explaining the rationale for the rule. 36 If commenters are disappointed with the final result, they may go to court. Besides reviewing the rule on the substantive grounds discussed in the previous section, the court will also decide whether the agency adequately responded to the public comments or, if no such procedure was held, whether the administration was correct in deciding that one of the exceptions to the requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking applied. Thus notice-and-comment rulemaking significantly limits administrative discretion, both on when and whom to consult and on what weight, if any, to give to objections from the regulated community. Although notice-and-comment rulemaking is formally open to anyone, a number of studies have found that, in practice, organized interests and market actors are the main participants, both because of the resources necessary to respond convincingly to administrative proposals and, in the event of defeat, call the administration to task before the courts, and because of the broad-reaching and abstract nature of the policy being decided, which rarely prompts action from individual citizens. 37 Notice-and-comment rulemaking was first introduced in 1946, with the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act. It was then amplified in the 1960s and 1970s by a series of court decisions that required administration to alert the public to all aspects of a proposed rule and to give careful consideration to public comments in the administrative statement supporting the final rule. 38 This judicial turn was driven by the sense that administration had been "captured" by industry actors and that public interest groups, which were rapidly proliferating at the time, should be guaranteed an equally prominent role in the policymaking process. 39 The original creation and subsequent development of notice-and-comment rulemaking reflects what, in the political science literature, is known as the American system of pluralist interest representation. 40 In 
Administration and the Public
In a number of administrative law systems, informal, broad-ranging public Ombudsmen share a number of characteristics. 44 They are institutionally linked to parliaments, not the executive branch, by virtue of the fact that they are appointed by parliament, generally for a fixed term, and are legally obligated to report periodically to parliament on their activities. The principal function of ombudsmen is to settle complaints filed by members of the public against the bureaucracy. The process is informal, in that a simple letter or online complaint form is sufficient to trigger an investigation and the grounds for complaining are extremely broad-anything linked to maladministration-and do not need to be styled as one of the grounds for obtaining legal redress in the courts. "The public officer was extremely rude" or "I never received an answer to the query that I filed with the tax office" is enough to warrant a response from the ombudsman. 45 The ombudsman system, therefore, offers the promise of redress to individuals without the resources to go to court and in circumstances that fail to meet the stringent legal criteria that have been developed by courts to make a successful claim against the administration.
Once the ombudsman comes to a decision on a complaint, the powers of the office are limited compared to courts. The ombudsman cannot order civil servants to comply with his or her decision but rather must rely on bureaucratic good will and the threat of bad press and public embarrassment to induce compliance. 46 The triangular relationship between the ombudsman, the press, and parliament is critical to ensuring the effectiveness of the institution. The threat of public censure and hostile parliamentary questions is the main tool in the ombudsman's arsenal and underscores the diffuse public accountability inherent in this area of administrative law. Ombudsmen in Sweden,
France, Denmark and many other countries are also involved in policymaking and regularly recommend changes to administrative law and practice to bring administration into line with rule of law ideals and fundamental rights guarantees.
Laws on the right of access to public documents also broaden public oversight of administration. 47 The right to government documents expands public scrutiny by giving ombudsmen. As for freedom of information, according to one study, almost seventy countries throughout the world have adopted the necessary legislation. 48 These overviews give an idea not only of the extent of diffuse public accountability as a feature of administrative law, but also of the remaining variations.
Legal systems still differ in the degree to which individuals seek formal recognition of their grievances through the courts or rely mostly on informal avenues of redress through ombudsmen. In some countries, parliamentary ombudsmen are absent, as in the United
States and Germany (at the federal level), and in others, the ombudsman system is considered ineffective. By contrast, in countries like Sweden and Denmark, the informal administrative justice offered by ombudsmen is immensely popular and tends to function as a substitute for courts. Freedom-of-information laws also have not taken root everywhere. Just in Europe, Italy and Greece are notable exceptions to the trend.
The Globalization of Administrative Law
This discussion would be incomplete without mention of the accelerating diffusion of administrative principles among legal systems, spurred by the forces of globalization. Traditionally one of the reasons that public law was said to be the poor cousin of private law in comparative studies was that public law was too idiosyncratic and contingent on domestic politics and national history for comparison to yield any fruitful insights. There is no doubt that administrative law is profoundly shaped by distinct national experiences with state formation. Today, however, the rise of a liberal consensus and the growing power of international organizations have prompted political actors in a variety of jurisdictions to adopt a common set of good governance reforms involving administrative procedures and principles of judicial review. Therefore, at least on the books, administrative law appears to be converging.
Transparency, where the last section ended, is a good example of the globalization phenomenon. As explained earlier, legislation on the right of access to government documents was first adopted in Sweden in 1766 and it was immediately copied in
Finland, which at the time was a Swedish colony. Two hundred years later, it still was limited to those two countries. Then, in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States and a handful of other European countries adopted freedom-of-information legislation. In 1993, the European Union followed suit, obliging not only its own institutions to hand over documents to the public, but also putting heavy pressure on all of its member countries to do the same. Since then, the United Nations, the Organization of American
States, and a number of other international organizations have urged their member countries to adopt freedom-of-information laws. By 2006, one survey found that nearly seventy countries had such laws and an additional fifty countries were in the process of drafting them. 49 And according to a recent analysis, the many transnational and international regulatory authorities that have sprung up over the past decades also have made commitments to transparency. 50 In sum, since the 1990s, the right of access to government documents has become a commonplace of public life and this is due in no small measure to the growing influence of international bodies in world politics.
One of the main challenges facing comparative law scholars today is to understand the operation, utility, and ultimately, desirability of these common procedures and principles in the multiple legal settings in which they now exist. To do so, it is necessary for comparative scholarship to move beyond the traditional national focus and to recognize the growing importance of international legal systems as objects of study in their own right and as catalysts for change at the domestic level. At bottom, however, comparative law is well equipped to handle this new task. It requires a deep appreciation of the historical diversity of national legal traditions and a familiarity with the many ways in which legal transplants can be transformed in the process of migration from one place to another. These are concerns that have traditionally been at the heart of comparative
